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This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with unionized labor markets. By 
accounting for productivity differences, the model features profit and wage differentials 
across industries. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on 
employment, welfare, and the distribution of income. In particular, we show that a movement 
from autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and 
therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share 
of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment as well as on the 
degree of centralization in union wage setting. Finally, the distribution of profit income across 
firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal 
when a country opens up to trade. 
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The distributional eects of international trade are a major concern of the general public and
policy makers alike. The common fear is that market integration improves the outside oppor-
tunities of rm owners and hence limits the possibility of workers to skim a fair share of the
rents arising from economic activity (OECD, 2007). This issue has been prominently discussed
in a large literature that addresses union wage setting in an international oligopoly (see, e.g.,
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Naylor, 1998; Lommerud, Meland, and Srgard, 2003). How-
ever, the focus of this literature is on rent sharing at the rm or industry level, while there is
no discussion on how trade aects the economy-wide distribution of prot and wage income, an
issue that is of primary interest for policy makers who are concerned about the impact of trade
on inequality and social justice (Bernanke, 2007; OECD, 2007).
It is the aim of this paper to provide a detailed discussion on how opening up to trade aects
the distribution of prot and wage income. For this purpose, we set up a general oligopolistic
equilibrium (GOLE) model along the lines of Neary (2009), with a continuum of industries, a
small and exogenous number of rms within each sector, Cournot competition, and labor as
the only factor of production. To account for rent sharing, we extend the Neary framework
and consider union wage setting, similar to Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009). Although our
analysis builds on the key insight from Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) that the trade eects on a
unionized oligopoly change substantially when general equilibrium feedback eects are accounted
for, there are several important dierences between the two approaches. Most importantly, we
do not restrict union activity to a subset of sectors but instead assume that it is equally relevant
for all industries. This gives rise to involuntary unemployment, which is an important aspect
of inequality.1 Furthermore, we assume that prots are not distributed to workers but rather
accrue to rm owners, who do not work. This assumption allows us to disentangle income
inequality between two key groups of economic agents { rm owners and workers { from income
inequality within these two groups of individuals, thereby providing a comprehensive picture
of how economic rents are distributed. Finally, we account for productivity dierences across
industries, in order to analyze how and to what extent industry-specic factors govern the
distributional eects of trade liberalization. Despite clear supportive evidence for the idea that
the interaction of industry-specic factors and rent sharing between rms and unions is an
important driving force behind changes in income inequality, this channel of inuence has so far
not been at the heart of interest in trade theory.2
1As pointed out by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) the risk of job loss is the main concern of workers, regarding
the labor market implications of trade liberalization. In view of such observations, Davidson, Martin, and Matusz
(1999, p. 272) argue that \trade economists should begin to seriously consider environments in which unemploy-
ment is carefully modeled". However, most of the existing studies on union wage-setting in an international trade
context do not tackle this issue. For an exception, see Eckel and Egger (2009).
2Early contributions that provide evidence for this interaction and its relevance for explaining wage inequality
include work by Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers (1989), and Grey
(1993). More recent evidence is provided by Plasman, Tojerow, and Rycx (2006) and Du Caju, Rycx, and Tojerow
2We start our analysis by characterizing the unionized GOLE model under autarky. Subse-
quently, we investigate how rm-level wage setting interacts with unemployment compensation
in determining the equilibrium outcome in the closed economy. Thereby, we nd that more
generous unemployment compensation leads to wage compression and thereby lowers aggregate
employment, utilitarian welfare, wage income inequality and the ratio between average prots
and average wages, as a measure of inter-group income inequality. The distribution of prot
income across rm owners becomes more unequal, because in sectors with low productivity
levels unemployment benets exert a stronger inuence on union wage claims than in sectors
with high productivity. Furthermore, we also investigate how productivity dierences across
sectors aect our results. In this respect, the most important insight is that a mean-preserving
spread in the technology distribution raises unemployment and thus lowers welfare. This result
diers substantially from Neary (2009), where { in view of a perfectly competitive labor market
{ aggregate employment stays constant, while utilitarian welfare increases as employment shifts
towards jobs with higher productivity.
In a second step, we analyze the opening up to free trade with a symmetric partner country.
This doubles the number of competitors in each industry, which ceteris paribus lowers prots
and hence wage claims of unions by means of a standard rent-sharing mechanism. However,
the number of consumers doubles as well. This makes both consumer and labor demand more
elastic and further reduces union wage claims. In sum, wages decline when a country opens up
for trade. This nding is well in line with previous work on international trade in unionized
oligopoly (see Huizinga, 1993; Srensen, 1993).3 With labor markets being more competitive
in the open economy, employment is stimulated and hence utilitarian welfare higher than in
the closed economy. In contrast to Neary (2009), positive welfare eects do also materialize
in a featureless economy, in which both countries are identical and all industries utilize the
same production technology. This conrms previous insights that employment adjustment in
imperfect labor markets provides an additional source for gains from trade that is dierent from
those in conventional settings (see e.g. Matusz, 1996; Egger, Egger, and Markusen, 2009).
Regarding the outcome of rent sharing, we nd that the average worker may gain or lose
relative to the average rm owner, with the respective result depending crucially on the market
(2008).
3Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) embed this framework into a Neary-type GOLE model in order to check
whether and to what extent the the wage reduction in response to trade depends on the assumption of partial
equilibrium. They nd that in a general equilibrium setting union wages do not necessarily fall if a country moves
from autarky to free trade, because wages in sectors with competitive labor markets, and hence the outside income
opportunities of workers in unionized industries increase. This eect disappears in our setting since we assume
that unions are equally relevant in all industries and unemployment benets are constant. As a consequence,
outside income opportuities of union members do not improve if a country opens up for trade. Beyond the eect
of a movement from autarky to trade, Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) also analyze the implications of a marginal
trade liberalization in an already open economy. In this respect, they show that the partial equilibrium wage
eects of a small trade cost reduction, as analyzed in Naylor (1998, 1999), are reinforced if a full set of general
equilibrium feedback eects is accounted for. The impact of a marginal trade liberalization is not addressed in
this paper, since the assumption of industry-specic productivity levels renders such an analysis a non-trivial
task, which is beyond the scope of this paper and thus left open for future research.
3power of producers. On the one hand, wages fall in all industries, which tends to increase
income inequality between these two groups of agents. On the other hand, prots may increase
or decrease. They increase if the market power of rms within their own industry is large {
more specically, if the autarky equilibrium is characterized by a monopolistic or a duopolistic
sectoral market structure. In this case, the opening up to trade improves the possibility of rm
owners to extract rents, but still raises welfare, because wage claims of unions become more
moderate and total employment expands. A similar eect was identied by Huizinga (1993) in
a partial equilibrium setting with a monopolistic market structure under autarky. Our analysis
however provides the additional insight that in the case of rm-level wage setting the number
of competitors must be suciently small in order for the positive prot eect to materialize. If
competition is already suciently intense under autarky, rm owners will lose in absolute terms
and relative to the average production worker when a country opens up for trade.
As a further novel result, we show that the distribution of prot income across rm owners
does not change in response to trade liberalization. There are two counteracting eects at work.
On the one hand, wages fall in all industries, with the respective decline being less pronounced
in sectors with low productivity due to wage compression in the presence of unemployment
compensation. All other things equal, this makes the distribution of prot income less equal.
On the other hand, the employment response to a given wage decline is less pronounced in
industries with high productivity, as rms in these sectors produce at a less elastic segment
of their labor demand curve. Both eects exactly cancel out in our setting, thereby leaving
the distribution of prot income across industries unaected. This result complements insights
from the heterogeneous rms literature, where the opening up to trade exhibits rm-specic
eects, with the most productive producers beneting from access to an export market and the
least productive ones losing due to imports from foreign rms (see Melitz, 2003). In our setting
product markets are fully integrated and hence all rms are equally exposed to the globalization
shock. As a consequence, rm-specic eects of a movement from autarky to free trade do
not materialize, so that the distribution of prot income across rms and industries remains
unaected.
As a nal aspect of the distributional consequences, we analyze how the opening up to trade
aects wage income inequality. There are two principle sources of inuence: changes in the
wage premium oered by more productive industries and changes in the relative employment
levels across industries. We show that a movement from autarky to free trade does not aect
the composition of workers across industries, while it lowers the wage premium oered by more
productive industries, as the existence of unemployment compensation causes a less than propor-
tional decline in the wage payments of sectors with low productivity. Noting that all workers in
our setting are ex ante identical this result contributes to the still small literature that addresses
the trade eects on intra-group wage inequality (see e.g W alde and Weiss, 2007).4 In particular,
4Empirical evidence from both sides of the Atlantic suggests that intra-group inequality accounts for a sub-
4the insights from our analysis complement the respective results from the relatively new strand
in the literature that introduces labor market imperfections into heterogeneous rms models in
order to analyze how the rm-specic eects of trade translate into worker-specic wage eects.
Since in these models only the most productive rms start exporting, employment as well as
wage payments increase in these rms relative to their less productive competitors, which fosters
wage inequality (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008; Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2008).5 In
our setting, all rms equally benet from access to the larger international market, while wage
compression at the lower end of the technology distribution reduces intra-group wage inequality.
This dierential eect is well in line with recent empirical evidence on the development of wage
inequality. For instance, relying on detailed UK data for the 1980s and the 1990s, Faggio, Sal-
vanes, and Van Reenen (2007) conclude that individual wage inequality has generally increased
and mainly so due to a rise of inequality between rms within the same industry, while the
relevance of industry eects has declined over the observation period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
framework and shows how the general oligopolistic equilibrium framework of Neary (2009) has
to be modied in order to account for rm-level union wage setting. Section 3 characterizes
the autarky equilibrium and provides insights on how unemployment compensation and key
parameters of the technology distribution aect the outcome in the closed economy. Section
4 considers trade between two symmetric countries and shows how the opening up to trade
aects wage payments, prots, aggregate employment, and welfare. Beyond that, this section
also provides insights on how trade changes the rent sharing between rm owners and workers
as well as the distribution of income within these two groups of agents. In Section 5 we consider
industry-level instead of rm-level unions and analyze to what extent our results depend on the
degree of centralization in union wage setting. The last section concludes with a brief summary
of the most important results.
2 The model set-up
We conduct our analysis in a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) framework, in which rms
are small enough to rationally ignore their inuence on aggregate variables, while they are large in
their own industry and hence engage in strategic interactions with their competitors. Production
and consumption is modeled along the lines of Neary (2009), who presents a workhorse model
of the GOLE theory. However, we deviate from the baseline model by accounting for labor
market imperfections due to the presence of labor unions (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009).
Furthermore, we distinguish between two types of agents: rm owners who receive prot income
stantial part of overall income inequality (see Katz and Autor, 1999; Barth and Lucifora, 2006; Autor, Katz, and
Kearney, 2008).
5Davis and Harrigan (2007) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) also consider intra-group wage inequality in a
setting with heterogeneous rms. However, in these models relative wages between any two rms are determined
by exogenous parameters, and hence they do not change in the process of globalization.
5and workers who receive wage income if employed and unemployment benets otherwise. Details
on our modeling strategy are outlined in Subsections 2.1-2.3.
2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
Preferences of the representative consumer are given by an additively separable utility function
over a continuum of dierent goods, with the sub-utility function for each of these goods being











The budget constraint of the representative consumer is given by
Z 1
0
p(z)x(z)dz  I; (2)
where p(z) denotes the price of good z, and I is aggregate income. Maximizing the utility in




[a   bx(z)]; (3)
where  represents the Lagrangian multiplier of the respective optimization problem. The
Lagrangian multiplier equals the marginal utility of income, which in our model is a function of





















For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Neary (2009).
2.2 Technology and production
We associate each good z with a separate production sector, and hence consider a large number
{ or more precisely a continuum { of industries. Firms in all industries use labor to produce a
homogeneous output and compete in quantities with the other rms in their industry. Output is
linear in the labor input: y = l=(z), with (z) denoting the labor input coecient in industry
z. We abstract from investment costs for establishing the production facility and consider an
exogenous number of rms, n, which is the same in each industry.
6Since the number of competitors within each industry is nite (or small), rms anticipate
that they can inuence industry-level variables, whereas they rationally take aggregate, economy-
wide variables as given. As a consequence, they treat  parametrically and therefore face linear
demand functions, according to (3). However, in contrast to a partial equilibrium model  is
endogenous for the economy as a whole. In what follows, we choose the representative consumer's
marginal utility of income as num eraire and set  equal to one. Considering product market
clearing,
Pn
i=1 yi = x(z), and accounting for demand function (3), we can then write prots of









where cj(z) = (z)wj denotes unit production costs. Throughout our analysis we focus on the
case of positive supply of all rms and hence restrict our attention to parameter congurations
that lead to a > cj(z) for all j and z. Without loss of generality, we assume that industries are
ranked such that (z) is increasing in z.
2.3 Labor market and endowments
Regarding the determination of factor return wj, we abandon the assumption of a perfectly
competitive labor market as in Neary (2009) and assume that each industry is populated by n
rm-level unions, which unilaterally set wages, while rms keep the right-to-manage employment
and choose lj = (z)yj to maximize prots (6) conditional on wj.6 The objective function of
the labor union is given by7
Vj = (wj    w)lj (7)
with  w denoting exogenous and constant unemployment benets. Due to our choice of num eraire,
the assumption of a constant  w implies that unemployment compensation is continuously ad-
justed by policy makers to keep it constant in terms of the representative consumer's marginal
utility . This assumption is useful for analytical tractability and has the nice implication that
nominal unemployment benets are increasing in aggregate income, which is well in line with
empirical evidence. To complete the characterization of the labor market in our model, we -
nally assume that the country is populated by L identical workers, each of them endowed with
one unit of labor.
6In a previous version of this manuscript, we have considered a slightly more general framework with wage
negotiations between rms and unions. However, since our main results do not hinge on the relative bargaining
strength of rms and unions, we decided to stick to the more parsimonious model in which unions have all the
bargaining power and therefore set wages unilaterally.
7Eq. (7) can either be interpreted as a Stone-Geary objective function, with unions simply maximizing rents
and workers being perfectly mobile across rms and industries (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009), or it can be
interpreted as a utilitarian objective function, with union membership being predetermined (see Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2003). For an overview on dierent objective functions, see Oswald (1985).
73 Equilibrium in the closed economy
The equilibrium outcome is determined by the solution of a two-stage problem with unions set-
ting wages at stage one, and rms deciding upon output (employment) and purchases taking
place at stage two. In Subsection 3.1, we solve the two-stage problem through backward induc-
tion and determine rm-level and industry-level variables. In Subsection 3.2 we solve for the
general equilibrium and determine economy-wide variables.
3.1 Solving for rm-level and industry-level variables
At stage 2, rms choose prot-maximizing output (employment) levels. With rms anticipating
that all their competitors in industry z are identical and hence set the same output level, yi = yk
8i;k 6= j, the solution to the prot-maximization problem of rm j is given by
yj =
a + (n   1)(z)wi   n(z)wj
b(n + 1)
; lj =
(z)[a + (n   1)(z)wi   n(z)wj]
b(n + 1)
; (8)
according to (6). To solve the wage-setting problem of union j, we substitute lj from (8) in (7)
and maximize the respective expression. Furthermore, considering symmetry, i.e. wj = wi, in
the rst-order condition dVj=dwj = 0, we obtain8
wj =
a + n(z)  w
(z)(n + 1)
 w(z): (9)
While all rms within a single industry pay identical wages, since they do not dier in technology,
it follows from (9) that sectors with higher labor productivity, i.e. a lower (z), pay higher wages.
This is intuitive, because rms in more productive sectors realize higher prots, all other things
equal, and unionized labor participates in these higher prots due to a rent-sharing mechanism.9




(z1)[a + n(z2)  w]
(z2)[a + n(z1)  w]
 !21: (10)
It is immediate that !21 > 1, because rms in sector z2 use a more productive technology than
rms in sector z1. However, the sectoral wage dierential, !21, is smaller than the prevailing
8Two remarks are in order here. First, rent sharing implies w(z) >  w if rms have market power and hence
make positive prots. In the limiting case of n ! 1, the model approaches to one with perfect competition in
the goods market, with zero prots, and hence w(z) =  w { provided the rms can hire the prot-maximizing
amount of labor at  w. Second, substituting w(z) from (9) into condition a > c(z), it is immediate that a > (1)  w
is sucient for an interior solution with a positive output level in all industries.
9There is indeed strong empirical support for the idea that more productive rms pay higher wages (see
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). This eect also survives if one controls for individual-specic factors, like education
or experience. Furthermore, existing results suggest that a substantial part of the prevailing wage dierential is
due to industry eects (see Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen, 2007). For instance, Blanchower, Oswald, and
Sanfey (1996, p. 241) conclude that \[c]hanges in industries' levels of prosperity have large eects upon workers'
remuneration."
8productivity dierential, due to the existence of unemployment compensation. Put dierently,
unemployment compensation leads to wage compression in our model. The impact of  w on the
wage dierential in (10) is monotonic. A higher unemployment benet raises the fallback income
of workers. This leads to higher wage claims of unions, with the respective eect being stronger
in sectors with lower productivity, according to (9). As a consequence, the wage dierential !21
shrinks if  w goes up.
Substituting the wage rate from (9) in (8), gives equilibrium output and employment levels:
y(z) 
n[a   (z)  w]
b(n + 1)2 ; l(z) 
n(z)[a   (z)  w]
b(n + 1)2 : (11)
The equilibrium price level then follows from (3):
p(z) =
(2n + 1)a + n2(z)  w
(n + 1)2 : (12)
Higher unemployment benets,  w, lead to higher wage claims and thus lower output and em-
ployment at the rm level. This reduces competition in the goods market and leads to higher
prices in all industries, according to (12). A higher labor input coecient (z) exhibits two
counteracting eects on unit production costs. On the one hand, these costs increase for a given
wage rate and, on the other hand, wage claims of unions become more moderate. The rst
(direct) eect dominates, and hence a higher (z) is associated with higher unit production
costs and a lower output level y(z). The fall in y(z) leads to an increase in the price level. Thus,
in line with Neary (2009) outputs are lower and prices are higher in less productive industries.
However, the respective output and price dierential across industries is smaller if labor markets
are unionized. Regarding employment, we can again distinguish two counteracting eects of an
increase in (z). On the one hand, it lowers output and thereby employment, l(z), all other
things equal. On the other hand, more labor is needed to produce a given level of output. In
general, it is not clear which of the two counteracting eects dominates. To be more specic,
we nd that dl(z)=d(z) >;=;< 0 if a >;=;< 2(z)  w. Hence, a positive employment eect of
an increase in (z) is the less likely, the higher is the level of unemployment benets,  w.
In a nal step, we can now substitute wage (9) for wj and output (11) for yj in (6), to
determine equilibrium prots (z). With linear demand, equilibrium prots are proportional
to the square of output, (z) = by(z)2, so that the comparative static eects of changes in  w
and (z) follow immediately from the respective eects on output y(z). This completes our
discussion on rm-level and industry-level variables.
3.2 Unemployment, welfare, and income distribution
With the insights from Subsection 3.1 at hand, we can now solve for the general equilibrium
and determine the economy-wide variables. The rst variable of interest is unemployment rate
9u, which is determined by






Substituting for l(z) from (11) gives
u = 1  
n2 [a1    w2]









being the rst and second moments of the technology distribution. From (14), we can deduce
that u > 0 holds if bL is suciently large. On the one hand, economy-wide labor demand
is independent of labor endowment, L. On the other hand, a higher b makes labor demand
less elastic, so that employment declines at any given wage rate. Throughout our analysis,
we focus on a suciently high bL, such that involuntary unemployment exists in equilibrium.
As noted in the last subsection, higher unemployment benets,  w, lead to higher wage claims
and to lower employment at the rm level. From (13), we see that this eect translates into a
higher unemployment rate. This is intuitive and well in line with the existing literature on labor
unions in general equilibrium models. To obtain insights into the role of labor productivity for
unemployment rate u, it is useful to rewrite (13) in the following way
u = 1  
n2 
(a   1  w)1   2  w

bL(n + 1)2 ; (130)
with 2 = 2   2
1 being the variance of the technology distribution. Notably, 2 = 0 implies
that all sectors produce with identical technology, and hence pay the same wage rate. In this
case, a higher average labor input coecient, 1, has an ambiguous eect on the unemployment
rate. It is positive for high levels of  w and negative for low ones. This result is well in line with
our insights from Section 3.1 that the impact of a change in (z) on employment at the rm level
is not clear in general and critically depends on the generosity of unemployment compensation.
If 2 > 0, labor productivity diers across industries. A mean-preserving spread in the
technology distribution, i.e. an increase in 2 for a given 1, raises the mass of sectors at the
lower and upper bound of the -scale. From above we know that the existence of unemployment
compensation compresses cross-sectoral wage dierentials, and hence the average wage must
increase if 2 goes up. However, with rms paying a higher wage on average, the labor market
imperfection becomes more severe and unemployment increases.
A further aggregate variable of interest is welfare. Substituting x(z) from (3) in (1), consid-
10ering  = 1 and ignoring constants, we obtain indirect utility of the representative consumer:
~ U =  
p
2. In view of (12), we can rewrite the latter expression in the following way:









(2n + 1)2a2 + n2  w1

2(2n + 1)a + n2  w1

+ n4  w22
(n + 1)4 : (15)
It is immediate that utilitarian welfare ~ U falls in  w. Higher unemployment benets lower both
total employment and aggregate output of industrial goods. This raises prices and therefore also

p
2 with negative consequences for indirect utility of the representative consumer. Furthermore,
we know from above that, all other things equal, a higher 1 may exhibit a positive or negative
impact on total employment. However, it denitely lowers aggregate output and hence raises
the second moment of the price distribution 
p
2, with a negative eect on ~ U. Finally, a mean-
preserving spread in the technology distribution reduces total employment and leads to lower
aggregate output. With a lower output, the second moment of prices increases and, as a conse-
quence, welfare falls. It is notable that the welfare eect of a higher 2 diers from Neary (2009)
who abstracts from adjustments in aggregate employment by considering a perfectly competi-
tive labor market. In his model, a mean-preserving spread in the technology distribution shifts
employment towards more productive sectors and thereby raises welfare, while in our framework
the negative total employment eect reverses the welfare implications of a higher 2.
In a next step, we can explicitly solve for aggregate prots, , and aggregate wage income,
W, with the respective values being given by
 =
n3 
a2   2a  w1 +  w22





a2 + (n   1)a  w1   n  w22

b(n + 1)3 : (17)
Since  and W are expressed in terms of marginal utility, changes in these variables lack a clear
economic interpretation. Hence, we do not further analyze these aggregates but rather look at
the ratio of average prots, ~   =n, and average wages ~ w = W=[(1 u)L], to obtain a measure
for inter-group income inequality. Considering (13), (16), (17) and denoting the prot-wage





a2   2a  w1 +  w22

[a1    w2]
a2 + (n   1)a  w1   n  w22
: (18)
This ratio approaches zero if rms have no market power, i.e. in the limiting case of n ! 1.
11With perfect competition rms make zero prots, while the common wage rate equals the
unemployment compensation,  w. Otherwise,  is strictly positive and it may exceed one if both
the unemployment compensation and the number of competitors are not too high. A higher  w
raises union wage claims and hence ~ w. At the same time, ~ , shrinks, implying that the prot-
wage ratio in (18) falls if unemployment compensation becomes more generous. Furthermore,
in the case of identical industries (2 = 0), a common increase in the labor input coecient
1 lowers prots per rm as well as union wage claims, which are linked to prots due to rent
sharing at the rm level. Hence, there are two counteracting eects on the prot-wage ratio, and
it is in general not clear which of these two eects dominates. Finally, with wage compression
due to unemployment compensation, a mean-preserving spread in the technology distribution,
i.e an increase in 2 for a given 1, raises both average prots and average wages, thereby
rendering the net impact on the prot-wage dierential ambiguous.
For a complete picture of income inequality, we additionally need to account for the cross-
sectoral distribution of prots and the personal income distribution of workers, as two measures
of intra-group income inequality. With a continuous distribution of prot and wage income,
it is a necessary rst step to nd an adequate summary statistics. The two most commonly
used metrics in this respect are the Gini and the Theil index. Both of these indices share
one important property: they are based on the Lorenz curve. Hence, instead of choosing one
particular index, we can directly look at the Lorenz curve in the subsequent analysis.
The Lorenz curve for prot income is given by10
J( z) 
a2 z   2a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz +  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
a2   2a  w1 +  w22
(19)
and plotted in Figure 1. J( z) has the usual properties: it is increasing and convex in  z. In
the borderline case of identical productivity levels in all industries, i.e. 2 = 0, the Lorenz
curve coincides with the diagonal of the Lorenz curve diagram, implying that prots are equally
distributed across industries. Consequently, a pari passu increase in all productivity levels, i.e.
an increase in 1 for 2 = 0, does not inuence prot income distribution. To the contrary,
a mean-preserving spread in the technology distribution shifts the Lorenz curve downwards,
implying that prots are unequally distributed across sectors if 2 > 0. Furthermore, a higher
 w shifts the Lorenz curve downwards, i.e. it lowers J( z) for any given  z 2 (0;1), and hence
raises cross-sectoral prot inequality. Higher unemployment benets induce higher wage claims,
according to (9), which reduces average prots ~ . However, with 2 > 0, the negative prot
eect is not equally strong in all industries. As outlined above, unemployment benets lead
to wage compression, and hence the increase in union wage claims as well as the decline in
prots is more pronounced in industries with low productivity, i.e. a high (z). This makes the
10Details on how the inequality measures in this subsection are determined and a formal discussion on their
properties are deferred to the appendix.
































Figure 1: The Lorenz curve for prot income
The Lorenz curve for wage income is slightly more complicated than the one for prot income
and characterized by the following two equations:
L( z) 
a2 z + (n   1)a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz   n  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz






1  z (z)dz    w
R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
a1    w2
; (21)
where the former equation determines the share of wage income that accrues to workers in
industries z   z, while the latter equation determines the share of production workers employed
in industry z   z:    ( z). Substituting  1( ) from (21) for  z in (20), gives the Lorenz
curve for labor income M( )  L( z( )), which is depicted in Figure 2. As formally shown in
the appendix, M( ) is increasing and convex in  . In the borderline case of 2 = 0, we have
 z =  . In this case, the Lorenz curve coincides with the diagonal of the Lorenz curve diagram,
implying that wage income is equally distributed among production workers, irrespective of the
size of 1. If 2 > 0, the existence of labor unions leads to cross-sectoral wage inequality of ex
ante identical workers.
With 2 > 0, unemployment compensation becomes a crucial determinant of the wage distri-
bution and an increase in  w aects shape and position of the Lorenz curve through two dierent
channels of inuence. On the one hand, higher unemployment benets lead to higher wage































Figure 2: The Lorenz curve for wage income
industries (see Eqs. (9) and (10)). This lowers the cross-sectoral wage dierential and hence
renders the wage distribution more equal. On the other hand, the higher labor costs lead to
a decline of employment in all sectors, with the relative employment between two industries
increasing in favor of the more productive one. This increases the cross-sectoral wage inequal-
ity ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, we are not able to determine the impact of a higher  w on
the distribution of wage income for arbitrary levels of unemployment benets. However, in
the appendix we show that introducing a small positive  w unambiguously lowers wage income
inequality.11 This completes our discussion of the closed economy.
4 The open economy
In this section, we consider trade between two countries, whose economies are as described in
Section 2. We abstract from any trade impediments and assume that goods markets are fully
integrated, while labor markets remain internationally segmented and workers are immobile
across countries. Furthermore, to facilitate our analysis we assume that the two countries under
consideration are fully symmetric in all respects.
In the open economy, aggregate demand for output of sector z can be determined by maxi-
mizing utility of the representative world consumer subject to his/her budget constraint. This
11In order to see whether this result holds more generally, we have conducted numerical simulation exercises
for two concrete specications of (z): (z) = e
z and (z) = 1 + z
2. These simulation exercises indicate that, at
least for the two considered specications, the inequality reducing eect of an increase in  w extends to positive
levels of unemployment benets.








where ~ b  b=2 implies that consumer demand is more elastic in the open economy than under
autarky. With this insight at hand, we can now proceed in total analogy to the closed economy,
when determining the trade equilibrium. Again, we start our analysis with the characterization
of rm and industry-wide variables and compare our ndings for the open economy with the
respective results under autarky.
4.1 Firm-level and industry-level variables in the open economy
Solving the maximization problem of rm-level unions gives wage rate
wt(z) =
a + 2n(z)  w
(z)(2n + 1)
: (90)
Comparing (90) with (9), it is immediate that wt(z) < wa(z), where superscripts t and a are
introduced in order to distinguish between trade and autarky variables, respectively. There are
three eects that can be distinguished. First, the number of competitors as well as the mass of
consumers doubles when a country starts trading with a symmetric partner country. In line with
textbook oligopoly models, we can thus conclude that for given wages the opening up to trade
leads to higher output and hence higher labor demand at the rm level. All other things equal,
this provides an incentive for unions to set higher wages. Second, the increased competition in
the goods market lowers prots and hence wage claims of unions by means of a standard rent-
sharing argument. Third, labor demand is more elastic in the open economy. This aects the
trade-o between higher wages and higher employment in union objective (7) and implies that
unions are more cautious about negative employment eects when increasing their wage claims.
In sum, the latter two eects dominate the former one, so that trade liberalization disciplines
unions and leads to more moderate wage setting.
The strength of this wage dampening eect is industry-specic and depends on the prevailing
productivity level. To shed further light on the role of productivity for the impact of trade on




(z1)[a + 2n(z2)  w]
(z2)[a + 2n(z1)  w]
: (100)
Comparing the latter with the respective ratio in the closed economy, we obtain !t
21 < !a
21,
implying that the cross-sectoral wage dierential shrinks if an economy opens up for trade. This
is intuitive, as the existence of unemployment compensation causes wage compression, and hence
15the decline in wages due to the opening up to trade is less pronounced in industries with low
productivity.12
Regarding output and employment in the open economy, we can calculate
yt(z) =
4n[a   (z)  w]
b(2n + 1)2 ; lt(z) 
4n(z)[a   (z)  w]
b(2n + 1)2 : (110)
On the one hand, rms expand activity at given wages and, on the other hand, wages decline.
Since both eects go into the same direction, it is immediate that rms operate at a larger scale
in the open than in the closed economy. Substituting x(z) = 2nyt(z) from (110) in (30), we can
conclude that the price in the open economy,
pt(z) =
(4n + 1)a + 4n2(z)  w
(2n + 1)2 ; (120)
is lower than the respective price under autarky, pa(z). This conrms the key nding of Brander
(1981) that trade exhibits a pro-competitive eect if an oligopolistic market structure with rms
competing in quantities prevails in the product market.
A nal industry level variable we are interested in are industry-wide prots within either
economy, nt(z). With the number of local producers being constant, the impact of trade
liberalization on industry-wide prots is fully characterized by the respective impact on rm-
level prots, which are given by a(z) = b[ya(z)]
2 and t(z) = (b=2)

yt(z)
2 in the closed and
the open economy, respectively. Substituting the output levels from (11) and (110), the following
result is immediate. Prots are higher in the free trade equilibrium than under autarky if the
number of competitors is suciently small.13 There are two counteracting eects at work. On
the one hand, there is stronger competition in the open economy, implying that prots at the
rm as well as the industry level shrink. For given wages, this eect is counteracted but not
dominated by the increase in the number of consumers. On the other hand, unions set lower
wages in the open economy, thereby providing an additional source for prot gains. It turns out
that the second eect is stronger than the rst one if the market power of rms is suciently
large.
Before turning to a characterization of aggregate variables and a comparison of these variables
with their counterparts in the closed economy, we summarize our results on rm-level and
industry-level trade eects in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A shift from autarky to free trade lowers wages as well as consumer prices,




21 = (z2)=(z1), according to (10) and (10
0).
13Note rst that 
t(z) >;=;< 
a(z) is equivalent to 8=(2n+1)
4 >;=;< 1=(n+1)
4, according to (11), (11
0) and
the respective expressions for rm level prots under autarky and free trade. Noting that 8(n+1)
4=(2n+1)
4 = 1
has a unique solution in R
+ at  n  2:14261, with 8(n + 1)
4=(2n + 1)
4 >;=;< 1 if  n >;=;< n, conrms the
respective result in the text. Restricting n to integer values, we can conclude from this that rm owners are
better-o in the free trade equilibrium if either a monopolistic (n = 1) or a duopolistic (n = 2) market structure
prevails in the autarky equilibrium.
16while employment and output increase at the rm as well as the industry level. The impact on
rm-level and industry-level prots is positive (negative) if the number of competitors is small
(large).
4.2 Aggregate variables in the open economy
In this subsection we close the general equilibrium model and study aggregate variables in the
open economy. The rst variable of interest is the unemployment rate, which is determined in
analogy to the closed economy and, using lt(z) from (110) instead of la(z) from (11), it is given
by
ut(z) = 1  
4n2 [a1    w2]
bL(2n + 1)2 : (1300)
Intuitively, due to a positive employment stimulus at the rm level, the unemployment rate must
be lower under free trade than under autarky. This result contributes to the ongoing debate on
whether product market liberalization is a substitute for labor market deregulation. In line with
Spector (2004), we nd that stronger competition reduces wage claims of unions and increases
total employment in the economy. However, there is a notable dierence between product market
liberalization in terms of entry of new rms in the domestic market (deregulation) and product
market liberalization in terms of competition from foreign producers. In the former case, prots
fall pari passu with wages, while in the latter case, rms may be better o if their market power
is signicant. Hence, the two policies are similar with respect to their labor market implications,
while they may dier substantially in their product market implications.
Changes in aggregate employment and output also exhibit an impact on utilitarian welfare.
Noting from above that welfare is measured by the representative consumer's indirect utility,
~ U =  
p
2, we obtain









(4n + 1)2a2 + 8n2  w1

(4n + 1)a   n2  w1

+ 8n4  w22
(2n + 1)4 ; (150)
according to (120). Comparing ~ Ut and ~ Ua, proves existence of gains from trade due to a fall in
consumer prices, i.e. pt(z) < pa(z) 8z. While this result is well in line with the positive welfare
eects in Neary (2009), there remains a crucial dierence between the mechanisms at work.
With perfect labor markets, there are no gains from trade if (i) the two economies are identical
in all respects and (ii) all industries utilize the same production technology. In such a featureless
economy increased competition shifts income from rms to workers but leaves aggregate output
and hence total real income unaected. In our framework, opening up to trade lowers union
wage claims and hence reduces involuntary unemployment. This increases output and lowers
17consumer prices, thereby providing a welfare stimulus even if 2 = 0 implies symmetric industries
in both economies. Notably, the welfare eects in this paper also dier from those in Bastos and
Kreickemeier (2009), who { similar to us { consider union wage setting in a general oligopolistic
equilibrium model. However, with unions being active only in a subset of industries, all workers
nd a job and hence aggregate employment and output eects cannot materialize in their setting.
Nonetheless, there are gains from trade in the Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) framework, even
if countries are identical and all industries use the same technology. The reason is that if sectors
dier in their labor market institutions, their wage costs and prices dier as well. In such a
setting, the opening up to trade reduces the wage premium in unionized industries and hence
the variance of consumer prices across sectors declines. This raises welfare even though aggregate
output stays constant in Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009).
While a comparison of (15) and (150) reveals that the economy as a whole is better o in the
open as compared to the closed economy, this does not mean that all individuals equally benet
from a movement towards free trade. For instance, those who are newly employed in the open
economy gain relative to those who stay in their old job. Furthermore, rm owners in highly
productive industries may gain or lose relative to rm owners in less productive industries as
well as relative to their employees. To determine the distributional eects of a movement from
autarky to free trade, we do not discuss all these cases separately, but rather look at summary
statistics. In particular, we consider three dierent measures of income inequality: (i) the ratio
between average prots and average wages,  = ~ = ~ w; (ii) the Lorenz curve for prot income, J;
and (iii) the Lorenz curve for wage income, M. We start with an analysis of the trade eects on
inter-group inequality.
In the open economy, aggregate prot and wage income are given by
t =
8n3 
a2   2a  w1 +  w22





a2 + (2n   1)a1  w   2n  w22

b(2n + 1)3 (170)





a2   2a  w1 +  w22

[a1    w2]
a2 + (2n   1)a  w1   2n  w22
; (180)
Comparing (18) and (180), we can conclude that inter-group inequality is larger in the open than
in the closed economy, i.e. t > a, if the number of competitors in either economy is small. As
formally shown in the appendix, n  2 is sucient for an increase in inter-group inequality after
trade liberalization. This is intuitive, as we already know that the opening up to trade lowers
18wages, while it raises prots if the market power of incumbent rms is large (see above). To
the contrary, if the number of competitors is suciently high, not only prot income but also
inter-group inequality is reduced by a shift from autarky to free trade.
To determine intra-group income inequality among rm owners and workers, we can look at
the position and shape of the respective Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve of prot income in the
open economy is given by
Jt( z) 
a2 z   2a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz +  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
a2   2a  w1 +  w22
; (190)
which equals Ja( z) in (19). Hence, a movement from autarky to trade does not aect the cross-
sectoral distribution of prots. Note that with linear demand prots are proportional to the
square of output (or employment). Regarding relative employment across industries, we can
distinguish two eects. On the one hand, rms in more productive industries produce at a
less elastic segment of the labor demand curve than rms in industries with a high (z). This
implies that a proportional reduction in wages induces a more than proportional expansion of
employment in industries with a high (z). On the other hand, wages do not fall proportionally,
according to Eq. (100). This counteracts and exactly osets the former eect, so that relative
employment and hence relative output levels remain unaected when a country moves from
autarky to free trade. However, with relative output remaining unaected, relative prots do
not change either, and hence the cross-sectoral prot distribution under autarky equals the
respective distribution under free trade.
As a nal element of our analysis, we now characterize the Lorenz curve for intra-group
income inequality among production workers in the open economy. To determine the respec-
tive curve, we proceed as under autarky and combine the Lorenz curve for cross-sectoral wage
inequality, which is given by
Lt( z) 
a2 z + (2n   1)a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz   2n  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
a2 + (2n   1)a  w1   2n  w22
; (200)
with the employment distribution across industries, which is characterized by the same ( z) as
in the closed economy, because { as noted above { relative employment between any two sectors
remains unaected when a country opens up for trade. Considering Eq. (21) and substituting
 z( ) =  1( ) in (200) gives the Lorenz curve for income inequality among production workers:
Mt() = Lt( z( )). Intuitively, since relative employment of any two industries stays constant,
while the wage premium of more productive industries shrinks, according to (100), intra-group
wage inequality must fall when two symmetric countries move from autarky to free trade. This
concludes the formal discussion and we summarize the main insights from our analysis in this
section in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A shift from autarky to free trade stimulates aggregate employment and welfare.
19Furthermore, it does not aect income inequality among rm owners, while it lowers income
inequality among production workers. The impact on inter-group inequality between rm owners
and production workers is not clear in general and critically depends on the market power of
rms in the closed economy. If competition in the closed economy is strong (weak), rm owners
will lose (gain) relative to production workers when a country opens up for trade.
5 Extension: Industry-level unions
While rm-level unions are broadly accepted to be a fairly good description of the UK as well
as the US labor market, it is an empirical fact that wage setting is signicantly more centralized
in continental Europe (OECD, 2004). This suggests to analyze the robustness of our results
regarding changes in the degree of centralization in union wage setting. For this purpose, we
modify our previous modeling approach and assume that unions are organized at the industry
instead of the rm level.14 The industry-level union is national in scope and sets a uniform wage
rate for all domestic rms in the respective sector. Its objective is to maximize VC = (w    w)nl
instead of (7), where subscript C refers to the centralized wage setting scenario in this section.
Using wi = wj in (8) and substituting the respective expression in VC gives union objective
under autarky as a function of the wage rate. Maximizing this objective yields
wa
C(z) =
a + (z)  w
2(z)
: (22)
When maximizing their rents, unions take into account the trade-o involved in setting higher
wages. On the one hand, choosing a higher wage rate raises VC for a given employment level. On
the other hand, a higher wage rate lowers employment and thus VC indirectly. This second eect
is more pronounced if unions are organized at the rm level, because a higher rm-specic wage
rate reduces competitiveness of the producer in the second-stage output game. Such a strategic
motive of setting lower wages does not exist if unions are organized at the industry level and
hence industry-level unions set higher wages than rm-level ones.15 This can be conrmed by
comparing Eqs. (9) and (22). The absence of this strategic motive in the wage setting of unions
also explains why the autarky wage rate does not depend on the number of competitors if unions
are organized at the industry level.
14In the interest of readability we present the main results of this section in an informal way, putting particular
emphasis on the economic intuition for the respective eects. Details on how the results have been derived are
deferred to a technical supplement which is available upon request.
15This is a common result in the literature on union wage setting and is well in line with the empirical observation
by Calmfors and Drill (1988) that the relationship between the degree of centralization in the organization of
unions and union wage claims is hump-shaped, with wages being highest if unions are organized at the industry
level.
20In the open economy, the rent-maximizing wage rate of the industry-level union is given by
wt
C(z) =
a + (z)  w(n + 1)
(z)(n + 2)
: (220)
The wage rate in (220) is higher than the respective wage rate chosen by rm-level unions in (90).
However, in contrast to the closed economy, wt
C depends on the number of competitors. The
reason is that unions are conned to national labor markets, so that two unions are active within
one industry in the open economy. This introduces a strategic motive for setting lower wages,
because lower wage costs increase the competitiveness of domestic producers vis- a-vis foreign
competitors in the second-stage output game. The strength of this strategic motive depends on
the number of competitors and it is less pronounced with industry-level unions than in the case
of rm-level wage setting.
From our considerations above we can conclude that unions set higher wages if organized
at the industry instead of the rm level, irrespective of whether the economy is in autarky
or has opened up for trade. This implies that an industry-wide organization of unions leads
to lower output and higher unemployment, and therefore exhibits higher welfare costs than a
more decentralized organization of unions at the rm level. Regarding income inequality, we
can rst note that higher wage claims induce a fall in prots, and hence the prot-wage ratio
is lower if unions are organized at the industry instead of the rm level. Put dierently, with
industry-level unions workers can skim a larger share of rents { while the total amount of rents is
smaller than in the case of rm-level wage setting. Income inequality among rm owners remains
unaected by a switch towards a more centralized organization of unions. The reason is that
all sectors are equally aected by this change in the structure of wage setting, thereby leaving
relative employment across industries unchanged. With prots being proportional to the square
of output, it is hence immediate that the degree of centralization in the organization of unions
has no bearing on prot income inequality. Finally, intra-group inequality is more pronounced
if unions are organized at the industry level. While relative employment across sectors does
not depend on the degree of centralization in union wage setting, the wage increase associated
with a switch from rm-level to industry-level unions is more pronounced in sectors with high
labor productivity, i.e. in those sectors in which the unemployment benet is a less important
determinant of the union wage claim. It is this second eect which explains that intra-group
wage inequality is more pronounced if unions are organized at the industry instead of the rm
level.16
16The nding that inter-group inequality is smaller while unemployment is higher if unions are organized
industry wide is well in line with the empirical observation that the US economy is characterized by high inter-
group inequality and low unemployment while the opposite is true in Europe. Krugman (1994) associates the
dierential experience with two sides of the same medal and argues that dierent institutional settings on the two
sides of the Atlantic are responsible for this outcome. Our model additionally indicates that intra-group wage
inequality is more pronounced in continental Europe, where wage bargaining is more centralized than in the US.
However, this hypothesis cannot be confronted with empirical evidence, because cross-country comparisons on
size and development of intra-group inequality are so far not available to the best of our knowledge.
21Regarding the movement from autarky to trade, there is only one notable dierence between
the setting with industry-level unions and the baseline scenario with wage setting at the rm
level. If unions are organized at the industry level, a strategic motive for setting lower wages
in order to improve the position of rms in the output competition does only materialize in
the open economy but not under autarky. Hence, the wage depressing eect of trade is more
pronounced than in a setting with rm-level unions, implying that in the model variant with
industry-level unions all rms experience a prot gain from trade, irrespective of the competitive
environment in the closed economy. In all other respects, the movement from autarky to trade
exhibits qualitatively the same eects under both regimes of union wage setting, and hence we
can conclude that the main insights from our analysis are robust to changes in the degree of
centralization in union wage setting.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with a unit mass of heterogeneous
industries and imperfect labor markets due to the existence of rm-level unions. In this setting
we investigate how a movement from autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner country
aects the product and labor market outcome. In particular, we show that unions face a more
elastic labor demand curve and hence reduce their wage claims, while rms increase their output
levels in the open economy. Beyond that, the results from our analysis suggest that taking the
existence of labor market frictions seriously is crucial for reaching a better understanding of
the prot eects of trade liberalization. Due to the decline in wage payments, rm owners may
benet from a movement towards free trade, at least if their market power under autarky is
suciently high. This qualies the wide-spread view that trade is a substitute for domestic
product market deregulation, as stronger competition in international markets should lower the
ability of rm owners to earn excessive prots. As pointed out in this paper, such a reasoning
is only valid if the labor market is perfectly competitive, while it may be wrong in the context
of union wage setting.
While the above eects would also arise in a partial equilibrium setting, the general equilib-
rium framework provides additional novel insights upon adjustments in economy-wide variables.
In this respect, our analysis shows that the opening up to trade lowers the incentive of unions
to set excessive wages and therefore raises employment and welfare. Aside from this positive
eciency eect, trade also reduces income inequality among production workers, while leaving
income inequality among rm owners unaected. This implies that trade uncouples the distri-
bution of prots from the distribution of wages even though the existence of unions leads to rent
sharing. Finally, inter-group inequality between rm owners and production workers may be
amplied or reduced by a movement from autarky to trade, with the respective eect crucially
depending on the market power of rms prior to the integration process.
22We hope that embedding a unionized oligopoly model into a general equilibrium framework
can help to improve our understanding on how trade liberalization aects product and labor
market outcomes. While accounting for general equilibrium feedback eects makes our analysis
more suitable for explaining real world problems, there are still simplifying assumptions that
limit the potential of our model for deriving concrete policy recommendations. For instance,
by focussing on symmetric countries, we cannot analyze whether unilateral policy reforms that
aim at deregulating the labor and/or the product market can be successful in an open economy.
Furthermore, the assumption of symmetric countries also implies that all trade is intra-industry,
while it rules out a dierential impact on exporting and importing industries, which has shown
to be important empirically (see Katz and Summers, 1989; Grey, 1993). Second, by assuming
that wage setting in both economies is organized at the same level (within rms or industry-
wide), our model cannot capture the empirical fact that the organization of labor unions diers
substantially across countries and it excludes a detailed discussion on labor market linkages in
international markets. While extending the model in either of these directions is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper, considering the respective modications may be a worthwhile task for
future research.
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The Lorenz curve for prot income in the closed economy: J( z)
To determine the Lorenz curve for prot income, we rst calculate aggregate prot income
accruing to rms with a labor input coecient higher than or equal to rms in industry 1    z.
Substituting y(z) from (8) in (z) = by(z)2, it is immediate that total prots in industry z,
(z)  n(z), are given by
(z) =
n3 [a   (z)  w]
2
b(n + 1)4 : (23)
Adding up (z) over all industries z  1    z gives







a2 z   2a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz +  w2 R 1
1  z (z)2dz
i
b(n + 1)4 ; (24)
with  (1) being equal to economy-wide prot income  in (16). Since the number of rms is
the same in all industries, 1    z denotes the fraction of rms with prots lower than (1    z).
Hence, the Lorenz curve for prot income is given by J( z) =  ( z)=, which can be reformulated




a2   2a  w  +  w2 2
a2   2a  w1 +  w22
> 0;
d2J( z)
d z2 =  
2  w[a      w]
a2   2a  w1 +  w22





which proves that the Lorenz curve J( z) has the standard properties: It is positively sloped and
convex (in  z).
The comparative-static eects in the main text regarding changes in 1 and 2 are immediate
and need no further formal discussion. To determine the impact of an increase in unemployment
compensation  w on J( z), we dierentiate dJ( z)=d z with respect to  w. This gives
d2J( z)
d zd  w
=  2
 
a     2  w
 
a2   2a  w1 +  w22

  (a1    w2)
 
a2   2a  w  +  w2 2
[a2   2a  w1 +  w22]
2 ;
which can be further simplied to
d2J( z)
d zd  w
=  
2a (a    w )
[a2   2a  w1 +  w22]
2G( ); (26)
27with























From this, we can conclude that d2J( z)=d zd  w >;=;< 0 if 0 >;=;< G( ). Notably, G( ) > 0 if
  = (1) or, equivalently  z = 0, while G( ) < 0 if   = (0), or equivalently  z = 1. Furthermore,
from dierentiating (27) we can deduce that G0( ) > 0 and hence G0( )  d =d z < 0. This
however implies that G( ) = 0 has a unique solution in  z 2 (0;1), which we denote by  z.
As a consequence, G( ) > 0 and thus d2J( z)=d zd  w < 0 if  z <  z, while G( ) < 0 and thus
d2J( z)=d zd  w > 0 if  z >  z. >From this we can deduce that the Lorenz curve for  w1 lies below
the Lorenz curve for  w0 if  w1 >  w0, implying that higher unemployment benets make the prot
income distribution more unequal. This conrms the respective result in the text.
The Lorenz curve for wage income in the closed economy: M( )
To determine the Lorenz curve for wage income, we need to combine two elements: the distribu-
tion of wage payments and the distribution of workers across industries. Starting with the rst
element, we can note that total wage payments of industry z are given by W(z)  nl(z)w(z).
In view of (9) and(11), this implies
W(z) =
n2 
a2 + (n   1)a(z)  w   n2(z)  w2
b(n + 1)3 (28)
Since industries are ranked according to their wages, with more productive industries paying
higher ones, we can conclude that the cumulative wage income of workers who are employed in
industries z  1    z, is given by







a2 z + (n   1)a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz   n  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
i
b(n + 1)3 : (29)
Notably,  W(1) equals economy-wide labor income W in (17). The ratio of labor income accruing
to workers in industries z  1   z is determined by L( z)   W( z)=W, which can be reformulated
to (20).
The second element we need to determine is the distribution of workers across industries.
28Total employment in industry z is given by L(z)  nl(z). Substituting l(z) from (11), we obtain
L(z) 
n2(z)[a   (z)  w]
b(n + 1)2 (30)
Hence, cumulative employment in industries z  1    z is given by













b(n + 1)2 ; (31)
with L(1) being equal to economy-wide employment
(1   u)L =
n2 [a1    w2]
b(n + 1)2 (32)
(see (13)). The ratio of workers who are employed in industries z  1    z is then represented
by ( z) in (21). Denoting the function value of ( z) by   and considering the inverse function
 z =  1( ) in (20) { with the properties of this inverse function following from (21) { nally
gives the Lorenz curve for wage income M( ).










a2 + (n   1)a   w   n 2  w2
a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2 
a1    w2
a     w 2 ; (33)
and
d2M( )
d 2 =  
[a1    w2]
2 
a 2  w2 + a2 (a   2  w)

[a2 + (n   1)a  w1   n  w22]





where   = (1    z) has been considered. Noting d =d z < 0, the latter two equations conrm
that M( ) is a positively sloped and convex function of  . While the results in the main text
regarding the comparative-static eects of changes in the two technology parameters 1 and 2
on M( ) are immediate, the impact of higher unemployment compensation is less obvious and
hence requires further discussion. To determine this impact, we dierentiate dM( )=d  with
29respect to  w, which yields
d2M( )
d d  w
=
d2L( z)









d d  w
=
a2 
(n   1)a(    1)   2n  w
 
 2   2

  n  w2(n   1)a
 
1 2    2

[a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2]
2 
a1    w2
a     w 2
+
a2 + (n   1)a   w   n 2  w2
a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2 
a (1    2)
[a     w 2]
2 :
Evaluating the latter expression at  w = 0, we obtain
d2M( )





















Notably, ~ G( ) > 0 if   = (0), i.e. if  z = 1, while ~ G( ) < 0 if   = (1), i.e. if  z = 0. Further-
more, ~ G0( ) > 0 and, hence, ~ G0( )d =d z < 0. We can therefore safely conclude that ~ G( ) = 0
has a unique solution in  z 2 (0;1), which we denote by  z. Then, d2M( )=d d  w


 w=0 > 0 if
 z <  z, while d2M( )=d d  w


 w=0 < 0 if  z >  z. This however implies that increasing unem-
ployment benets from zero to a small positive level lowers wage income inequality according
to the Lorenz curve criterion, thereby conrming the respective result in the main text.
A comparison of a and t
From a comparison of (18) and (180), we can conclude that t >;=;< a is equivalent to
8
(2n + 1)2 [a2 + (2n   1)a  w1   2n  w22]
>;=;<
1
(n + 1)2 [a2 + (n   1)a  w1   n  w22]
: (37)







a2 + (2n   1)a  w1   2n  w22
a2 + (n   1)a  w1   n  w22
; (38)
we can further note that t >;=;< a is equivalent to A(n) >;=;< B(n). In order to determine
how the ranking of A(n) and B(n) depends on rm number n, we have to characterize the
properties of these two functions. Straightforward calculations give A(0) = 8, limn!1 A(n) = 1
and A0(n) < 0. Furthermore, we nd B(0) = 1, limn!1 B(n) = 2 and B0(n) > 0. This
however implies that A(n) = B(n) has a unique solution in n, which we denote by n. Then,
30A(n) > B(n) and thus t > a if n < n, whereas A(n) < B(n) and thus t < a if n > n.
To conne the possible values of n, we can can evaluate A(n) and B(n) at n = 2. This yields
A(2) = 216=125 = 1:728 and
B(2) =
a2 + 3a  w1   4  w22
a2 + a  w1   2  w22
; (39)
respectively. Rearranging terms, we nd that A(2) >;=;< B(2) is equivalent to
0;728a(a    w1) >;=;< 0;544  w1






However, noting a >  w1 and 2 > 2
1, it is immediate that the right-hand-side of the latter
expression is smaller than its left-hand side, so that A(n) > B(n) or, equivalently, t > a if
n  2 This conrms the respective result in the main text.
The Lorenz curve for prot income in the open economy: Jt( z)
To determine the Lorenz curve for prot income in the open economy, we follow the respective
steps in the closed economy and rst calculate
t(z) =
8n3 [a   (z)  w]
2
b(2n + 1)4 : (41)
Adding up over all industries z  1    z further implies







a2 z   2a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz +  w2 R 1
1  z (z)2dz
i
b(2n + 1)4 ; (42)
with  t(1) being equal to aggregate prot income t in (160). Hence, the Lorenz curve for prot
income is given by Jt( z) =  t( z)=t, which can be reformulated to (190) and hence conrms
that the Lorenz curve for prot income remains unaected by the movement from autarky to
free trade.
The Lorenz curve for wage income in the open economy: Mt( )
In analogy to the closed economy, we rst calculate total wage payments of industry z, which
in views of (90) and (110) is given by
Wt(z) =
4n2 
a2 + (2n   1)a(z)  w   2n2(z)  w2
b(2n + 1)3 (43)
31With industries being ranked according to their wages, the cumulative wage income of workers
who are employed in industries z  1    z, is given by
 Wt( z) =
4n2
h
a2 z + (2n   1)a  w
R 1
1  z (z)dz   2n  w2 R 1
1  z 2(z)dz
i
b(2n + 1)3 ; (44)
where  Wt(1) equals economy-wide labor income Wt in (170). The ratio of labor income accruing
to workers in industries z  1  z is determined by Lt( z)   W( z)=W, which can be reformulated
to (200).
Furthermore, considering (110), total employment in industry z can be written as
Lt(z) 
4n2(z)[a   (z)  w]
b(2n + 1)2 (45)
and cumulative employment in industries z  1    z is given by









b(2n + 1)2 : (46)
The ratio of workers who are employed in industries z  1   z is given by ( z) in (21) and hence
equals the respective ratio in the closed economy. Combining (200) and (21), nally gives the
Lorenz curve for wage income Mt( ).
Noting that the distribution of workers across industries, ( z), is the same in the closed
and the open economy, it follows from (20) and (200) that the movement from autarky to free
trade aects the Lorenz curve only through an increase in the number of competitors (which
doubles). We can hence learn the impact of trade liberalization on wage income inequality from





a  w     w2 2
a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2
[a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2]
2 
a1    w2
a     w 2
 

a  w1    w2 2

a2 + (n   1)a   w   n 2  w2
[a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2]
2 
a1    w2
a     w 2 (47)




a  w (a    w )G( )
[a2 + (n   1)a1  w   n2  w2]
2 
a1    w2
a     w 2 ; (48)
with G( ) being dened in (27). Considering the properties of G( ) from above, we can therefore
conclude that a higher n lowers wage income inequality according to the Lorenz criterion. This
conrms the respective result concerning the impact of trade liberalization on wage income
inequality in the main text.
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